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Alfred North Whitehead offered to the twentieth century a
metaphysical system purporting to transcend the impasse of
materialism and idealism, synthesize the quantum- and wavetheories of the transmission of energy, establish a non-empirical
basis for all geometry, and account for human freedom, cosmic
evolution, and Einsteinian physics. The sheer virtuosity of
such a performance is staggering; and it is hardly surprising
that Whitehead includes in his system an explanation for God
and his relationship to the world.
Nor is it surprising, in a generation that is not entirely satisfied with classical, liberal, or neo-Reformation ideas of God,
that there should be a serious attempt to use Whitehead's
thought as a philosophical framework for a modern Christian
understanding of deity. To this task John B. Cobb, Jr. implicitly committed hmself in 1962, and A Chrzstiart Natzcral
Theology 3 is the first major result of his constructive effort.
The present article offers a brief, highly condensed summary of
Whitehead's idea of God, a short exposition of Cobb's developThis dissatisfaction is most clearly seen in the so-called "God is
dead" emphasis of several younger American theologians-notably
Paul Van Buren, Thomas J . J . Altizer, and William Hamilton-deriving from such sources as Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, and contemporary
analytic philosophy. Hamilton has described this viewpoint in "The
Death of God Theology," The Christian Scholar, XLVIII (1965), 27-48.
Cf. statements by Van Buren, Altizer, and Hamilton in the series "How
I Am Making Up My Mind," CC, LXXXII (1965),428-30, 864-67,
1219-22.

Cf. his Living Options i n Protesta.nt Theology: A Survey of Methods
(Philadelphia, 1962)~pp. 14-15. 3 15-16.
A Christian Natural Theology : Based on the Thought of Alfred North
Whitehead (Philadelphia, r 965).
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ment and revision of this idea, and some critical comments on
both method and result.

For Whitehead, philosophy is the ultimate generalization of
relationships, including all relationships of all entities that can
in any sense be said to exist. This means that if there is the
entity "God," it too must come within the domain of metaphysical rationalization. The following paragraphs are based
on Whitehead's explication of his idea of God in Science and ifhe
Modem World (originally published in 1925)~
ti Religion in the
Making (1926), Process and Reality ( ~ g z g ) , and Adventures
of Ideas (1933). with supplementary reference to Modes of
Tkozcght (1938).
The ultimate metaphysical principle in Whitehead's system
is not God but "creativity" (PR II) ; in the formal statement
of the categorial scheme (PR 30-42) "God" does not appear a t
all, either specifically or by implication. Thus "God" is a
Whitehead's own vocabulary has been used wherever possible,
with the first occurrence of each technical term enclosed in quotation
marks. More detailed introduction to Whitehead's idea of God may be
found in Cobb's summary in A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 135-75;
Ivor Leclerq, Whitehead's Metaphysics : An Introductory Exposition
(London, 1958)~pp. 195-208 ; and William A. Christian, A n Interpretation of Whitehead's Meta$&ysics (New Haven, 1959)' pp. 283-413. The
basic interpretative statement is Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's
Idea of God," in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul
Arthur Schilpp (Evanston, Ill., 1g41), pp. 515-59.
6 Hereafter cited as "SMW."
Page references are to the New
American Library (Mentor) edition (New York, 1948).
6 Hereafter cited as "RM." Page references are to the World Publishing Co. (Meridian/Living Age) edition (Cleveland, 1960).
7 Hereafter cited as "PR." Page references are to the Harper
Torchbooks (The Academy Library) edition (New York, 1960). and
are identical to the Macmillan edition (New York, 1929).
8 Hereafter cited as "AI." Page references are to the New American
Library (Mentor) edition (New York, I 955).
Hereafter cited as "MT." Page references are to the Capricorn
edition (New York, 1958),and are identical to the Macmillan edition
(New York, 1938).
@
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derivative notion, lo a thoroughly comprehensible element
(A1 171-72) in the philosophical explanation of the world as we
know it.
By itself creativity is pure, abstract actuality, "without a
character of its own" (PR 47). I t is the function of God, as the
"principle of concretion" (PR 374), to give form to actuality ;
that is, he l1 is the ultimate limitation of actualization in the
sense that he determines "(i) the special logical relationships
which all events conform to, (ii) the selection of relationships
to which the events do conform, and (iii) the particularity
which infects the course even within these general relationships
of logic and causation" (SMW 160). In terms of directionality,
the function of God is "to sustain the aim at vivid experience"
(MT 128).But this is not determinism; rather, "the indetermination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate
freedom" (RM 88). Yet it is precisely these limitations that
establish the difference between good and evil (SMW 161).
God is at once both the primordial qualification of actuality
and its non-derivative, unconditioned actualization (RM gg ;
PR 48, 522). Since there is in the universe "only one genus of
actual entities" (PR 168))God is, like all other beings, a "creature" and part of the world (PR 102), "a factor in the universe"
(RM 71). Among the characteristics which God shares with
other actual entities are these: the basic function of decision
amid potentiality (PR 68) ; "dipolarity," which is the combination of "mental" (though not always conscious) and "physical"
10 Cf. Christian, "The Concept of God as a Derivative Notion," in
Process and Divinity : The Hartshor.lze Festschrift, ed. William L. Reese
and Eugene Freeman (La Salle, Ill., 1964), pp. 182-89.
11 Whitehead regularly used the pronoun "he" in referring to God,
but this was merely following convention and not an indication of
"personality" in God (cf. RM 60-64) as in traditional Christian thought.
Had Whitehead used a different proper noun to refer to God (such as
"Eros," which occurs occasionally in AI), he would certainly have used
( I ' I,
it rather than "he" where such a pronoun was required. His reason
for using "God" was that "the contemplation of our natures, as enjoining real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order, acquires
that 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship a t which
religions aim" (PR 47).
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relationships with other entities (PR 54) ; a threefold nature,
namely, "primordial," "consequent," and "superjective" (PR
134) ;transcendence over-that is, a certain freedom from the
causal influence of-all other entities (PR 136, 339) in the
sense of self-creation or self-causation (RM 99; PR 339) ; and
a capacity to function as instruments of novelty for other
entities (PR 529).
On the other hand, there is a certain uniqueness in God in
terms of both nature and function. He alone is non-temporal
(PR 73; RM 88) and transcends any finite cosmic epoch (PR
143; MT 128) ; he alone has no character "given" by the past
(PR 134). He is further distinguished by the fact that he
originates from the mental rather than the physical "pole" of
his being (PR 54, 528) ; he is the ground of all mentality (PR
529) and the ultimate referent of truth (PR 19). He is characterized by the priority of permanence rather than flux in his
nature, and unity rather than multiplicity (PR 529). To maintain an awareness of this singularity, Whitehead excludes God
from the meaning of "actual occasions,') a term whch designates all other actual entities (PR 135).
God is related to the rest of the world through his primordial
and consequent natures. The primordial nature is an abstraction, deficient in actuality (PR 50), but not therefore devoid of
efficacy (PR 530). I t is this aspect of God that functions as the
principle of concretion (PR 374, 523) ; his primordial nature
consists in conceptualizing and valuating all the "eternal
objects" or categories of possibility in the universe (SMW 88,
99-100; PR 46, 70, 134, 382, 392) and then relating them to
each "concrescent" (this term functions as a present-participial
form of "concrete") occasion as its "subjective aim," that is,
its ideal of actualization in harmony with its actual situation
in the world (RM 91,146-48 ; PR 134,248,343).In other words,
it is the primordial nature of God that makes pure potentiality
into real potentiality for an actual entity (PR 69-73). And it is
by means of his primordial nature that God is immanent in the
world as the ground of the relationship between physical and
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mental "prehensions" (PR 78)) the contacts between actualities by means of which one appropriates (and thus is affected
by) another as a component of its own essence. Thus God is the
"supreme Eros" (A1 ZOI), the "eternal urge of desire" (PR 522)
that guides the ongoing advance of novelty a t every stage so
that it moves toward the realization of the ultimate perfection
which is his own ultimate satisfaction as the fulfillment of his
own subjective aim (PR 134 ; A1 251, 274-76). This fulfillment
constitutes God's superjective nature.
In this way the primordial nature of God is the ground of
both novelty and order. Without his conceptualization and
organization of eternal objects as possibilities for actualization,
there would be no progress toward the deeper reality, the intensification of experience that is the goal of the creative
process; for eternal objects apart from God are without
influence, and without his structuring of the totality of eternal
objects, novelty itself would result in sheer chaos in the universe (RM 151-53; PR 46, 73, 75, 161, 164, 248, 377, 523; MT
128). While the efficacy of the primordial nature does not
eliminate the creative freedom of actual occasions, its envisagement of relationships is so complete that it is "not added to, or
disturbed by" any actualization of creativity (RM 147).
Complementing the primordial nature of God is his consequent nature, which is (or results from) his own physical
prehension of the actualities of the evolving universe (PR 134,
527,530). I n contrast to the primordial nature, the consequent
nature of God is described as conscious, incomplete, conditioned, actual, and everlasting (PR 524). Having "prehended"
the self-creating entities of the world into its own developing
wholeness, the consequent nature of God is in turn prehended
by new occasions, of whose world it is always a part. Thus God
again (in addition to the "objectification" of his primordial
nature for conceptual prehension by concrescent occasions)
becomes a constitutive factor in the world, l2 and perishing
la Cf. Daniel Day Williams, "How Does God Act? An Essay in
Whitehead's Metaphysics," in Process and Divinity,pp. 178-80.
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occasions are granted the fulfillment of their yearning for
immortality (PR 533). Moreover, God's everlasting consequent
nature may be related to the human "soul" in such a way that
the latter "may be freed from its complete dependence on
bodily organization" (A1 209)) since the mental poles of occasions are not subject to measurable time and space (A1 247).
Finally, here God may be understood in terms of a tender care
that nothing of value be lost, as well as in terms of wisdom,
patience, and love for the world (PR 525, 527, 532). But the
"power" of God is not anything like intervention; it is the
worship he inspires (SMW 172).
It is clearly the primordial rather than the consequent
nature of God that fundamentally distinguishes him from the
rest of the world and involves him in the creative process.
Although God may be described as "Creator" because of his
objectification for actual occasions as the ground for advance
into novelty, this designation has unfortunate and misleading
connotations of priority, ultimacy, volition, sovereignty, omnipotence, and personality (PR 343-44, 520). These elements of
the Semitic concept of God (RM 66) have remained in Christian
thought and are mischievous theologically as well as philosophically (A1 171-74) ;on one hand they make God the source of
evil (SMW 161) and on the other they put him beyond metaphysical conceptualization (RM 68). It is better therefore to
say not that God is before all creation but that he is with all
creation (PR ~ z I )and
, to say not that he creates the world but
that he saves it (PR 526). God and the world require each
other; they are mutually interdependent (PR 528 ; AT 173).l3
Whitehead insists that he is not, like Descartes and Leibniz,
introducing God into his system as an emergency measure to
save the metaphysical principles from collapse (PR 78, 219,
289),because for him God is not an exception to these princi18 Hartshorne, p. 521, offers this interpretative modification: "The
world could.. . have been different from what it is, but some sort of
world must have been 'there,' that is, must have been the content to
the divine knower and the effect of the divine cause."
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ples but rather their chief exemplification (PR 521). God is
therefore intentionally secularized and rationalized (PR 51516; A1 171-72).The rationalization is almost complete-but
not quite: for why the relationships among the entities of the
universe are what they are is a mystery of God's nature. No
other reason can be given for them because that nature is the
ground of rationality itself (SMW 160-61) ; they can only be
discovered as they are. Finally, "the concept of 'God' is the
way in which we understand this incredible fact-that what
cannot be [namely, the correlation of opposites in actualization], yet is" (PR 531).
This then is Whitehead's God: a combination of creatureliness and primordiality, dependence and transcendence, conceptualization and actualization, mentality and physicality,
novelty and order, conditionedness and freedom, objectification and prehension, rationality and irrationality, abstraction
and concrescence. I t must be admitted that in some ways such
a God seems more impressive as a Supreme Being than is the
God of classical Christian theism. 14

II
Cobb emphasizes that his intention in A Christian Natural
Theology is not to diverge from Whitehead's own basic viewpoint, approach, and objective; rather he is attempting to
understand God's being and relationships entirely in terms of
the principles that characterize Whitehead's system IS--a goal
which, according to Cobb, Whitehead himself failed to achieve.
The program of revision involves five points.
Cf. Hartshorne, p. 523.
In the dedication of his book to Hartshorne, Cobb acknowledges
the importance of the latter's influence. Cf. the evaluation Cobb gives
in " 'Perfection Exists' : A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," RL,
XXXII (1962-63),p. 302 : "In my persona1 view Hartshorne's greatest
achievement is not his brilliant revival of certain arguments for the
existence of God but his development of a concept of God fully compatible with all that we know about the world, self-consistent within
itself, and of profound religious significance."
lP

l6
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(I) Cobb disagrees first with Whitehead's dichotomizing of
God's nature, l6 observing that "too often he deals with the
two natures as if they were genuinely separable. Further, he
frequently writes as though God were simply the addition of
these two natures. Thus God's primordial nature performs
certain functions and his consequent nature others" (p. 178).
This systematic disjunction not only neglects the fundamental
unity of God as an actual entity, but also involves a misunderstanding of the functions of the two natures in relation to the
world, making it impossible to explain "how the eternally
unchanging primordial nature of God can provide different
initial aims to every occasion" (pp. 179-80).
Cobb would solve this problem by suggesting that God's own
subjective aim at intensity of feeling involves (a) a propositional prehension concerning the satisfaction of each becoming
occasion within its peculiar situation in the world, and (b) the
actualization of himself in such a way that it maximizes the
possibility of that satisfaction. The concrescent occasion then
prehends this prehension, which in turn forms part of the initial
phase of the occasion's own subjective aim. Thus the initial
aim for the new occasion is included in its "initial data" and is
not a distinct element as Whitehead describes i t ; and it comes
from the totality of God's nature and not from the primordial
nature only. Moreover, Cobb holds that the initial aim may
derive in part from other (preceding) actual occasions which,
like God, can have propositional prehensions concerning the
satisfactions of the new occasion (although the role of God
remains decisive). And Cobb also suggests that there are other
prehensions of God quite similar to those involved in the
provision of the initial aim. In short, the reception of the initial
Is I t is characteristic of Whitehead's thought that in PR the primordial nature of God is discussed in almost complete separation from
the consequent nature; the former is almost wholly missing from the
final chapter, "God and the World," and the latter appears hardly
anywhere else.
l7 Williams, pp. 161-180, notes the need to emphasize the unity of
God, but maintains a distinction in the functions of the two natures.
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aim from God is not unlike an occasion's other prehensions of
God or its prehensions of other entities.
(2) Another proposed revision concerns the relation of time
and personness in God. Whitehead repeatedly refers to God as
"an actual entity," but he also asserts that in distinction from
all other entities God is non-temporal (that is, eternal) in
regard to his primordial nature and everlasting (that is,
cumulative of all elements of process without loss) in regard to
his consequent nature. Cobb concludes that these latter
assertions about God and time "compel us to assimilate God
more closely to the conception of a living person than to that
of an actual entity" (p. 188), so that he should be understood
as "a succession of moments of experience with a special
continuity7' (p. 188 ; cf. pp. 71-79).
Now Whitehead recognizes two kinds of time: (a) time as
transition between occasions, the time of the efficacy of causal
sequence, or "physical timeJJ; and (2) time within occasions,
the non-divided time of internal process. If God is an actual
entity, then his time is the latter kind and process in him is
t o be understood as the internal process of concrescence.
But in that case the question of his efficacy in the world
becomes acute; for efficacy is understood by Whitehead
only in terms of succession; efficacy always means non-contemporaneity, and if God has no past he cannot be objectified
for (that is, affect) the world. But Whitehead himself insists
on the efficacy of God's consequent nature; and on the basis
of the unity of God's nature (as Cobb argues) even the provision of the initial aim for each occasjon involves efficacy.
Furthermore, God's experience of his own satjsfaction-an
experience that comes a t the completion of an entity-implies
that as a continuing existent he is something other or at least
more than an entity. l 8
So Cobb understands God as in important respects similar
to what we know as personness. But this idea has its own
problems, for in Whitehead's thought persons lack complete
l8

Hartshorne, pp. 544-50, moves in the same direction.
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self-identity through time and experience loss of what is past.
Cobb therefore suggests that God "vividly and consciously
remembers in every new occasion all the occasions of the
past" (p. 191); since all the occasions of the past are included
in his own past, he thus maintains his identity and loses
nothing of value in spite of the real pastness of his past.
Finally, the idea of God as a living person requires that his
conceptualization of the totality of eternal objects be conceived as a succession of acts, just as Whitehead understands
a succession of occasions in the single "experience" of looking
a t a picture for, say, a minute. God is thus a personal succession of unimaginably rapid occasions. lD
Cobb maintains
"that the chief reasons for insisting that God is an actual
entity can be satisfied by the view that he is a living person,
that this view makes the doctrine of God more coherent, and
that no serious new difficulties are raised" (p. 192).
(3) Yet another problem is the relation of God to space.
Although Whitehead does not attend specifically to this
question, his system allows three possibilities: God may be
local, or nonspatial, or omnispatial. Of these, the first is ruled
out by the fact that God is related with equal immediacy to
occasions everywhere in space. The second was probably
the position tacitly assumed by Whitehead, thinking of God
primarily in terms of his primordial nature and its conceptual
prehension by actual occasions apart from spatial relations.
In fact, his system admits the theoretical possibility that
"physical experience may also be prehended apart from
contiguityJ' (p. 194).
But the idea of God as nonspatial creates an essential
difference between God and other actual entities, all of which
have regional standpoints; and it is Cobb's aim to reduce
such differences wherever possible. So he suggests that God
Is These must be rapid enough to enable God to discriminate between
non-synchronous electronic occasions. In contrast, human personal
occasions succeed each other a t a rate of approximately 10 per second,
according to Cobb.
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too is spatial, and since his standpoint "could not be such
as to favor one part of the universe over others, it must be
all-inclusive" (p. 195).The only problem is the question of the
possibility of the inclusion of the region of one occasion
within the region of another. Having already argued in favor
of this possibility in regard to the relationship of human
experience to the brain (pp. 82-91), Cobb easily draws an
analogous conclusion here. At the same time he recognizes
that there is no real issue here except metaphysical consistency. If God is nonspatial, he is equally related to all regions
and occasions, and it is as if he were omnispatial ; thus it seems
more logical to affirm that he is omnispatial.
(4) Next Cobb turns to the uniqueness of God's function
in relating eternal objects to actual occasions, and here he sees
another element of incoherence : Whitehead seems to introduce
God in order to explain the efficacy of eternal objects in the
concrescence of actual occasions, without relating this function
to the other elements of the system or explaining it in terms
of the system. The resulting problem is two-fold: "First, it
seems that God renders eternal objects effective for actual
occasions in a way radicdly different from that in which
temporal occasions make them effective for each other.
Second, God seems to envisage eternal objects in a way for
which the conceptual prehensions of actual occasions provide
no analogy" (p. 198).
The first part of the problem is partially resolved by Cobb's
previous idea that the subjective aim of an occasion derives
initially not only from God but also from past occasions
which, like God, include propositional prehensions of noveltythat is, possibilities of actualization-for the new occasion.
In other words, the uniqueness of God is not radical; he
"envisages and orders all eternal objects, whereas temporal
occasions can order only an infinitesimal selection of eternal
objects" (p. 201).This argument brings us to the second part
of the problem, for it suggests that, in principle, actual
occasions can prehend eternal objects directly and that, as
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is the case in regard to God, "their own decisions can be
explanatory of the conceptual prehensions not derived from
physical prehensions" (p. 202). 20 Cobb does not insist that
this in fact happens, only that it is not categorically impossible. And again there remains a vast difference in degree;
the point is simply that "a temporal occasion may have toward
some eternal object the kind of relationship God has toward
all" (p. 203). If this does happen, Cobb thinks that its occurrence may well be connected with the highly reflective consciousness of human occasions.
Thus Cobb would replace the formulation in Process and
Reality of a unique relationship of God to eternal objects
with Whitehead's earlier but presumably more adequate
statement that "the forms belong no more to God than to
any one occasion" (RM 157).
(5) Finally, Cobb offers a clarification of the role of God in
creation. For Whitehead, God's creative function consists of
contributing the initial phase of the subjective aim of each
new occasion, thereby determining which preceding occasions
it will prehend and how they will be objectified for it. Thus
God in effect selects the causal factors in each occasion.
But his responsibility is not absolute, for it is qualified by
(a)thegivenness of the situation, (b)the freedom of each occasion to adjust its own aim, (c) the presupposition of eternal
objects which God does not create, and (d) the temporal and
a0 The two aspects of the problem seem more closely related than
Cobb's separate discussion of them suggests. For the argument for the
partial derivation of the subjective aim from preceding occasions presupposes the possibility in them of some genuine novelty not derived
from God. Otherwise it is only a matter of the directness or indirectness
of God's own provision of the subjective aim, a function that is not
paralleled in any other actual entities; and if this is so, Cobb's whole
point of increased coherence is lost.
2 1 How this might occur-that
is, on what basis and according to
what criteria a concrescent occasion might adjust itself-whitehead
does not explain. Presumably this is the Whiteheadian approach to
the mystery of self-determination, which he does not limit to personal
occasions but extends to all actual entities. This is ultimately the source
of evil (cf. infra, section V).
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ontological equiprimordiality of the world (or conversely,
the absence of any original creatio ex nihilo). Thus God is not,
in Whitehead's thought, the ultimate reason why there is
anything at all instead of nothing.
I t is the function of God to give efficacy to creativity, which
is itself not an actual entity and does not "exist," and therefore cannot function as the "creator" of anything. On the
other hand, however, creativity is not merely one of the totality of eternal objects; for eternal objects express pure possibilities indeterminate to any one occasion, and creativity is
necessary if there is to be any occasion at all. Therefore
creativity is neither abstract in the usual sense, nor actual or
concrete. But, Cobb observes, it is still far from clear why
there is anything, for the idea of creativity itself does not
explain why creativity continues to be actualized: "It seems
just as possible that it will simply stop, that there w i l l be then
just nothing. . . . If occasions ceased to occur, then there
would be no creativity. Creativity can explain only ex post
facto" (p. 2x1). The conclusion is that God is not only the
limitation of the form of existence but also the "reasonJJ
(whatever that is) why anything exists, so that "God's role
in creation is more radical and fundamental than Whitehead's
language usually suggestsJ' (pp. zxx-12). Once more this is
not intended as a departure from the essential Whitehead,
but a closer adherence to his own definitions and principles in
order to increase the coherence of the system as a whole.
Like Whitehead, Cobb refuses to claim for God "either
eminent reality or necessary existenceJJ (p. 213); 22 God is
simply an infinite series of occasions, but since he exists he
will continue to exist everlastingly because he aims to do so
and has the power to do so.
In concluding his proposed clarification of Whitehead's
doctrine of God, Cobb reiterates his contention that although
the function of God is not radically different from that of
This of course reflects a refusal to follow Hartshorne's revival of
the ontological argument for the existence of God.
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other actual entities, it is decisive. Without him, neither
creativity nor the past nor both together could provide a
future. "God always (and some temporal occasions sometimes)
is the reason that each new occasion becomes. God, past
occasions, and the new occasion are conjointly the reason
for what it becomes. Whatever it becomes, it will always,
necessarily, be a new embodiment of creativity" (p. 214).

Cobb asks (p. 269) to be judged according to the soundness
of his philosophy. In general he seems successful in raising
significant questions by identifying important elements of
incoherence in Whitehead's doctrine of God. But he seems
somewhat less successful in providing answers in terms of
acceptable alternative f orrnulations.
Whitehead's dichotomized and mostly abstract God is
clearly unsatisfactory. Although he insists that God is an
actual entity, he generally ignores just those elements of his
being (namely, his consequent nature) that are necessary for
him to be actual. The fact that Whitehead finds it hardly
necessary to mention the consequent nature of God at all
until it appears as the subject of the final chapter of Process
a.nd Reality makes a certain feeling of incoherence inescapable. 23 Nor is the situation improved by Whitehead's
reference to the peculiarly religious involvement of God's
consequent nature (for example, the idea of God as love,
patience, and companionship) at the end of an intentionally
secularized system of metaphysics. If God is really to be
understood as an actual entity, the system requires some such
adjustment as Cobb offers. And his suggestions toward an
understanding of the unity of God's nature and function are
23 The greatest of several difficulties encountered by readers of
PR lies in the fact that every argument seems to presuppose everything
that follows it, so that the beginning is just as unintelligible without
the end as the end is without the beginning. The notion of the consequent nature of God is a remarkable exemption from this circularity.

WHITEHEADIAN DOCTRINE O F GOD

I21

in harmony with the overall system, in which actual entities
regularly function and are prehended as unities.
The crucial question which arises at this point is whether
this unitary functioning of God implies a pastness in God
parallel to the pastness of prehended actual occasions. In order
to accommodate the fact that God influences the world (that is,
is efficacious in the provision of the initial phase of the subjective aim of occasions by the objectification of his primordial
nature, and in the influence of his consequent nature-or
better, in Cobb's view, in both together), one must concur with
Cobb's rejection of the view that God is afi actual entity; and
understanding God in some sort of analogy to "a living person"
is an attractive suggestion, especially in the light of the
Biblical picture of a "living God." But in the framework of
Whiteheadian thought this idea is not as free of systematic
difficulties as Cobb assumes.
What is a "person" ? For Whitehead "an enduring personality" is "a route of occasions in which the successors with
some completeness sum up their predecessors" (PR 531);
Cobb applies this description to God, appropriately revising
"some completeness" to "absolute completeness." But he
neglects to seek for the grozmd of the route of occasions. In the
temporal world, that ground is God, whose unitary primordial
nature provides the initial aim for each occasion and thus
furnishes order in successive occasions, in enduring objects,
in living persons, and in the totality of the universe. As long
as God is auc actual entity there is no problem, for everything
is held together by the unity of that one non-temporal,
transepochal entity. If, however, God is not arz entity but a
series of ontologically discrete actualizations, the question of
the ground of his unity becomes impossible to answer within
the system. 24 NOWCobb is not unaware of this problem, but
This weakness was first brought to my attention in conversation
with Langdon Gilkey. Subsequent to the preparation of the present
article, Gilkey has published an extensive review of A Christian
Natural Theology in TAT,XXII (1965-66),
530-545, in which he takes
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his proposed solution in terms of the completeness of God's
prehension of his own past as well as all pastness of all occasions seems to fall short. For " 'life' means novelty"
(PR 159))and thus to say that God's total prehension of the
past is the ground of his self-identity through time is of dubious
meaning. And simply to affirm this self-identity and continuity
is of course just the kind of arbitrariness that Cobb intends to
avoid.
I n view of the persuasiveness of Cobb's argument concerning
the difference between the role of actual entities and role of
God in Whitehead's system, not to mention the formidable
set of distinctions indicated by Whitehead himself (cf. sufira,
p. 3), it would seem possible and perhaps more satisfactory
to follow the master's lead in the direction opposite to that
in which Cobb moves, and admit God as one of the categorial
ultimates in the system, with no more need to assimilate him
either to actual entities or to persons than there is to assimilate
creativity to eternal objects. I t is interesting that Cobb
himself enumerates "the four ultimate elements" as "actual
occasions, God, eternal objects, and creativity" (p. 177).
He rightly objects to ('arbitrary disconnection," but the
disconnection here seems more essential than arbitrary.
Of course the disconnection need not be absolute ; there is
no reason why these ultimate elements may not show some
similarities to each other such as Cobb notes between creativity
and eternal objects. Thus the important emphasis Cobb gives
to the fundamental unity of God and his relationships to the
world need not be lost.
On the other hand, if God is affirmed as a fourth ultimate
rather than an entity within the category of actual entities,
some of Cobb's arguments seem unnecessary or at least
unimportant. In the first place, the incentive for maintaining
the omnispatiality of God is considerably weakened. Since
creativity and eternal objects are nonspatial, there seems no
issue with Cobb on some of the problems mentioned here in sections
111-v.
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intrinsic reason to favor the notion of God's spatiality (and
hence omnispatiality) just because of the spatiality of actual
entities. As Cobb recognizes, the question makes no difference
for the actualization of any occasion, and may therefore be
argued on other grounds (if any) or left open. In the second
place, if God is in a category separate from actual entities,
there is no essential reason to argue for the capacity of actual
occasions either to have propositional prehensions of novelty
for subsequent occasions or to prehend eternal objects
directly; God can hold this capacity uniquely. Of course, if
Cobb is in fact correct in his affirmation of this capacity for
all actual entities, his denial of the eminent reality and
necessary being of God is readily understandable; but in that
case it would be difficult to see on what ground he also affirms
the "radical decisiveness" of God's role in creation.
A final reason for taking a path opposite from Cobb's
assimilation of God to actual entities is the very cogency of
his argument for giving God a more fundamental role in
creation than does Whitehead. He demonstrates convincingly
that pure creativity is even less adequate an explanation for
the existence of actualities than was Aristotle's "prime
matter," and that God "must be conceived as being the reason
that entities occur at all as well as determining the limits
within which they can achieve their own forms" (p. 211).
But if God is in some sense the ground of being of actual
entities (in precisely what sense, he does not spell out), it is
surely creating confusion to understand God either as an
actual entity or as a series of actual entities with a special
continuity. Cobb's revision of Whitehead thus seems to be
moving in two different directions. In contrast, a redefinition
of God in the context of an ultimate quaternity of elements
(Creativity, Creative Forms, Creator, and Creature, each
presupposing the other three), while attributing to God a
reality and necessity denied by both Whitehead and Cobb,
would nevertheless avoid the problems that Cobb has encountered in his development of a Whiteheadian view of God.
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But incorporating into Whiteheadian thought the idea of
God as wi generis is perhaps impossible. At least it would
raise for the Whiteheadians the same perplexing question that
has harassed Christian theology for centuries and has been
sharply reemphasized by the impact of analytic philosophy :
on what basis is any language about God meaningful? If God
cannot be understood in terms of the category of actual
entities, can he be understood at all? Or must he remain
essentially an unknown quantity ? While Christian theology
might be willing to live permanently with these questions,
Whiteheadian metaphysics can hardly do so; for the whole
thrust of its doctrine of God has been toward complete
intelligibility. Therefore, although Whitehead's own view
(God as aut actual entity) is quite unacceptable, both Cobb's
alternative (God as a "living person") and the one suggested
here (God as categorially unique) seem to engender more
difficulties for Whiteheadian thought than they resolve.

Another and no less crucial problem in A Christian Natwal
Theology concerns methodology. Now there is a certain irony
in suggesting that methodology is a problem for John Cobb ;
for he is acutely aware, and has done much to make others
aware, of the place of method in the understanding and
evaluation of theological systems. His Living OPtiom in
Protestant Theology is aptly subtitled "A Survey of Methods,"
and he has concluded the presentation of his own philosophical
theology with a 32-page explanation of the way in which the
theological task in general and philosophical theology in
particular should be undertaken. And he has said the right
things. He has noted the similarities as well as the differences
between theology and philosophy, and he has pointed out that
philosophical theology overlaps both of these disciplines while
being identical with neither. Therefore "natural theology"
is not the old and hopeless endeavor to ground Christian
thought on neutral, universally acknowledged rational
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principles; it is rather the systematic explication of the
presuppositions of Christian thought-presuppositions which
are inevitably subject to critical evaluation from nontheological viewpoints, that is, in the context of more general
reflection. Cobb establishes the necessity of this kind of
enterprise by showing that if it is not taken seriously the
result is not no natural theology but an unconscious, uncriticized-and therefore probably poor and possibly aliennatural theology, with the consequence that the whole
theological structure is weakened. He cites Augustine and
Thomas Aquinas as classical examples of natural theology
in its most practical form: the adaptation and development
of an available philosophy so that it can serve as a "Christian
natural theology." Cobb intends his own work on Whitehead
to be a similar endeavor.
He explains why he has chosen Whitehead's philosophy to
revise and use as a framework for Christian theology : (a) it is
intrinsically excellent as a philosophical system; (b) its vision
of reality is compatible with that of the Christian faith ; and
(c) it corresponds with his own fundamental vision of reality.
Now about (a) there is no argument, and about (c) Cobb
himself is the only competent judge. But it seems strange that
(b) is so quickly assumed-and on the curiously inadequate
basis that Whitehead's own environment was culturally
influenced by Christianity (in a way the environment of
Aristotle or even Plotinus was not). Since the compatibility of
Whitehead's philosophy and Christian faith is widely disputed,
it would seem that Cobb should endeavor to demonstrate its
reality. 26
Cobb's inattention to this problem is reflected also in his
neglect of an essential difference between the theological
enterprise of Augustine and Thomas (as he himself describes it)
a6 A short step in this direction is taken by Norman Pittenger, "A
Contemporary Trend in North American Theology: Process-Thought
and Christian Faith," RL, XXXIV (1964-65),
$02-03. But this necessarily brief statement is hardly convincing.
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and his own endeavor. For them the objective was to adapt
philosophical categories for the elucidation of a Christian
theological perspective ;for him the objective is quite different
(P. 269):

. . have I intended to replace philosophical argument
by dogmatic assertion or to distort Whitehead so as to render him
more amenable to Christian use. My attempt has been to make the
philosophical doctrines conform to the philosophical norms. . . .
A Christian natural theology must not be a hybrid of philosophy
and Christian convictions. It must be philosophically responsible
throughout.

At no point.

I t is remarkable that Cobb apparently fails to recognize how
different his stance is from that of Augustine and Thomas ;
his allegiance to Whitehead's philosophical principles is in
sharp contrast to their willingness to "distort" the philosophical systems they adopted in order to make them "more
amenable to Christian use.
I am not here contending that Cobb's enterprise is wrongheaded; the point is that to label it "Christian natural
theology" and to imply a parallel to the work of Augustine
and Thomas is an unfortunate source of confusion if his
principal interest is philosophical-and this seems certainly
the case. Nor is the confusion eliminated by reference to his
singularly broad definition of theology as "any coherent
statement about matters of ultimate concern that recognizes
that the perspective by which it is governed is received from a
community of faith') (p. 252). This definition merely reintroduces the question of the immediate identification of
Whit eheadian philosophy, which is clearly "the perspective
by which [Cobb's "Christian natural theology"] is governed,"
as the perspective which can be reasonably understood to be
"received from a [Christian] community of faith."
If Cobb is in fact writing "Christian natural theology," his
work is subject to two sets of critical criteria; this is the price
that is always required of those who would carry on an interdisciplinary project. To the extent that natural theology is
philosophical, he is correct to observe that it must be judged
"
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qua philosophical, and not hopefully received just because of
its Christian convictions. But to the extent that natural
theology is theological and Christian, there ought to be an
equal openness to criticism in these terms. Yet this latter
element is missing; why? Perhaps because of an epistemological assumption that quite naturally accompanies Whiteheadian philosophy: the susceptibility of all truth, including
theological truth, to metaphysical rationalization. In other
words, there is here an undiscussed question of theological
authority which, so long as it remains undiscussed, is just as
subversive of sound theology as is the undiscussed ontological
assumptions against which Cobb properly warns.
It is instructive to recall that whenever philosophical
categories have become, intentionally or by default, authoritative in a system of Christian theology (as in Gnosticism and
Deism), the system has become heretical. This is the historical
part of the reason why some theologians have been so skeptical
of any kind of philosophical theology that they have (unfortunately) denied its usefulness altogether.
Just as theological affirmations are never completely
neutral ontologically, so metaphysical systems are never
completely neutral theologically. Therefore any philosophy
not consciously constructed in terms of specifically Christian
thought-and no important philosophy has been originally
constructed in this way-will probably carry implications that
are hostile to Christian theology. So long as Cobb intends to
write Christian theology he ought to recognize that the
"community of faith" provides not only its context but also,
in an important sense, the criteria for its validity-in the form
of scripture or tradition or present experience or some combination of these. Where the implications of these criteria
conflict with his philosophical conclusions, he has only two
theologically sound options: he can either subordinate the
philosophical interests to the theological, or he can learn to
live with the tension between them. To ignore the necessity
of rigorous criticism in the light of theological norms, as he
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has apparently done, is to create a "natural theology" that
is not genuine theology at all, and may well go the wayultimately-of Gnosticism and Deism. As it stands, his work
might more appropriately be called A Whiteheadian.Ph&?osophy
of Religion. 26

Although it has just been suggested that Cobb's presentation
is incomplete as it stands, it may be assumed that a fuller
discussion in the future will tend to clarify rather than
modify the conception of God he has expressed. The following
paragraphs are therefore intended as a brief discusssion of this
conception when considered from the context of Christian
theology. 2 7 That is to say, I am here attempting to indicate
the kind of questions that Cobb needs to examine very
thoroughly if his doctrine of God is to be received (in spite
of the methodological impediments) as theologically acceptable. 28
(I) A basic question is whether or not Christian theology
can accommodate a metaphysical rationalization of God.
2e It is possible that the two issues raised in this section-the
assumption of the fundamental compatibility of Whiteheadian philosophy and
Christian theology, and the neglect of theological norms as valid
criteria for philosophical theology-were intentionally excluded from
the initial presentation of A Christian NaturaE Theology. Thus the
present complaint may be merely a reflection of unwarranted irritation
over (a) a misjudgment of the book's objective, resulting from a
literalistic reading of its title and an accompanying failure to take the
subtitle seriously enough, andlor (b) the fact that Cobb did not write
the book that this reader wanted and expected him to write. But he
does imply (p. 2 5 2 ) that he has now said what he believes needs to be
said on the subject, and that his future writing is likely to move to
other areas, such as Christology and soteriology (p. 12).
"Christian theology" may be defined, for the purposes of this
discussion, as the central understanding of God, man, and the world
shared generally by classical, Reformation, and (to a lesser extent)
contemporary Christian thought.
Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 382413, shows an awareness of the importance of this task, although he
himself does not really attempt it.
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Here the divergence seems radical in both meanings of the
word--degree and depth. For Christian thought has always
maintained, even in its most rationalistic forms, a final
incomprehensibility as part of its basic understanding of deity.
There is, to be sure, much less conflict between Whiteheadian
thought and popular piety, which has always tended to
forget that it knows God only by means of symbols, and that
the symbols are necessarily anthropomorphic. And it is also
to be noted that neither the Whiteheadian God nor the popular
Christian God is wholly open to human understanding: the
reasons why things are what they are, and happen as they do,
are veiled in the mystery of the divine nature. Nevertheless
the general "feeling" about God is that he is rational and
regular.
But theology is not so easily satisfied as is popular piety,
especially in regard to the assumption of regularity (which
is the ground of rationality)-the assumption that all things
are what they are because that is what they must be. Thus
theology denies what piety tends to accept, namely, the idea
of "God. . . in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground"
(PR 529). Theology insists that God's aseity (or, as Whitehead
liked to put it, the fact that God is causa szci) means that he
is transcendent not only in the Whiteheadian sense of the
freedom of self-creativity but also in the sense of freedom
from all other entities and principles-rational, metaphysical,
or whatever-encompassed by human thought. Whitehead
himself points in this direction when he identifies God as the
ground of rationality; yet he does not really mean ultimate
ground, but only proximate ground.
This problem has afflicted most philosophers' Gods, who
are what the various metaphysical systems let them be and
cannot be anything else. But in such cases "God" seems an
inappropriate word, for what the philosophers too often
describe seems more like a cosmic functionary, obediently
performing his duties. The idea of a "rationalized God" is
simply a more sophisticated formulation of the self-contra-
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dictory notion of a "conditioned God." The question is
whether a meaningful concept of God requires--or, on the
other hand, allows-his nature and function to be conditioned
by the rational categories of a fully consistent ontology. 29
Again, it is not the point of this article to show that the
Whiteheadian assumption ought not to be made; the point
is that the question of a "rationalized God" involves a fundamental vision of reality, and that here Whiteheadian metaphysics and Christian theology do not seem compatible.
The latter insists that ontology is an expression of God's
nature andlor being ; the former insists that God is an instance
of metaphysical principles. The question is: is God within
the system or outside it ? Can philosophy include God or only
point to him ?
(2) Besides the formal question of the relation of God to the
philosophical system, there is also the material question of
the relation of God to cosmic process itself, that is, the relation
of God to the world by means of creation. Cobb takes two
important steps toward the theological affirmation of God
29 I t may be objected that this whole argument is based on a confusion of the order of being with the order of knowing, and that neither
Whitehead nor Cobb nor any other metaphysician is really "imprisoning
God within a metaphysical system" as is here implied, but that each
is describing ultimate reality on the basis of the evidence he encounters.
I n other words, just as the statement, "I see a green patch; therefore
there is grass beneath my window," does not mean that the patch of
green I see is the ontological cause of the grass, but only the ground of
my knowing that the grass is there, so also the statement, "I see an
orderly world ; therefore God functions within a metaphysical order,"
does not mean that what I see (and subsequently formulate logically
into a metaphysical system) is the cause of ultimate reality but only
the ground of my knowing what ultimate reality is like. But both
statements presuppose (a) the comprehensibility of that to which
the evidence points (for example, grass qua grass is knowable),
and (b) an ontological correspondence between the evidence itself
and that reality to which i t points (grass is in fact green). In the case
of the grass, these presuppositions may be verified to the point of
practical certainty; in the case of ultimate reality, they remain fundamental assumptions upon which the Whiteheadian and other philosophical concepts of God rest.
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as Creator. First, by emphasizing the unity of the primordial
and consequent natures of God he makes possible an understanding of causal efficacy in a way that Whitehead did not
clearly establish: God's role in creation becomes "actual" or
"concrete." Secondly, Cobb makes God the reason for the
existence of anything as well as the primary factor in its
particular form. But he is still far from affirming God as a
Creator who creates ex nihilo, for not only do creativity
and eternal objects (which are not actual entities) remain
equiprimordial with God, but so does the world. To use a
clumsy metaphor: God pushes the button that lets creativity
flow into actual entities, and a t the same time regulates the
amperage, voltage, and alternation of the current; but he is
not the source of the current. God is an element in the process,
indeed its supreme element; but he is not its ground.
The subordination of God to process brings other, derivative
difficulties. In the first place, it effectively removes God from
the definition of evil, and so empties that concept of theological
meaning. As a corollary to the argument that if God is "the
foundation of the metaphysical system with its ultimate
activity" he must be the source of evil, Whitehead says that
"it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the
Evil" (SMW 161).Although Whitehead does not elaborate
his meaning, it can have no connection with any kind of
divine "will," for God is not to be understood in terms of
volition. Presumably the idea is that the initial aim which
God supplies to every occasion is the Good, since it derives
from God's subjective aim for his own satisfaction and is
thus a part of the creative advance that is the goal of eternal
process. A creative decision in each concrescent occasion can
adjust this initial aim in the light of (a) aims inherited from
other occasions and (b) its own immediate prehension of
eternal objects (these two are Cobb's suggestions), as well
as (c) its own "subjective form" or "effective feeling"; but
this hardly corresponds to the Christian idea of radical
disobedience, rebellion, or sin. In the Whiteheadian system
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evil is incoherence, a conflict of cross-purposes; and in the
nature of things it "promotes its own elimination" (RM 94).
I t is not by oversight that Cobb omits the idea of evil from
his chapter on the nature of religion ; there is no real connection
between the two ideas. 30
In the second place, if God is only part of creative process
and not its ultimate ground, the concept of worship is considerably weakened. Even if Cobb is right in saying that
"one does not worship in order t o achieve some good. One
worships because that which he dimly apprehends evokes
worship" (pp. 216-17), the question remains whether a finite
God-who
is "in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical
ground" (PR 529) and who is as ontologically dependent on
the world as the world is dependent on him-does in fact
evoke worship in the Christian sense. If he is not really
Creator he can hardly be Saviour, except in the sense of
stimulating an awareness of meaning in a function analogous
to that of a great philosopher or prophet or poet, whose
insight lights up some aspect of reality for others. If that is all
that exists to be worshipped, it is difficult to see how the
act of worship can retain any essential meaning for a Christian.
Whether a doctrine of God that (a) limits his function and
being to a prescribed place in a metaphysical construction,
(b) expands the category of ultimacy to include the world
of actual entities as well as God, (c) divorces God from the
concept of evil, and (d) eliminates the primary ground for
worship, can serve as an expression of Christian belief is a
question that Cobb and his fellow Whiteheadians ought not
to evade.
The underlying optimism about the upward direction of the eternal process seems axiomatic with Cobb as well as with Whitehead,
and provides a significant point of contact between them and Teilhard
de Chardin. Cf. Cobb, "Christian Natural Theology and Christian
Existence," CC, LXXXII (1965)~
266.
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The predominantly negative tone of the second half of
this article tends to obscure the possibility that Whteheadian
thought may yet furnish (or point to) ways of thinking useful
to a formulation of a theologically valid and intellectually
meaningful doctrine of God.
Certainly the idea of primordial and consequent natures,
especially as revised and unified by Cobb, is a suggestive
way of understanding the relationship of God's transcendence,
absoluteness, and eternity on the one hand and his relatedness
and responsiveness to history on the other. I t seems to make
less difficult-though of course not more true-the simultaneous affirmations that God is ontologically unconditioned and
that what he experiences is in a certain sense dependent on
human response, so that how human beings use their creaturely
freedom does make a difference to him. However much the
idea of the love of God is interpreted as disinterested agape,
it must retain the idea that the world matters to God, and
this must mean that he is in some way experientially conditioned by it. And the "two natures" concept also facilitates
the affirmation of a real pastness in God, an affirmation
that is closely related to the possibility of directionality
and meaning in time. That is, for God as well as for man,
Creation, Incarnation, and Redemption must be an order
of events; a t least it is impossible to conceive of them as
significant without such an order.
Another possible contribution is the indirect suggestion of
Creativity, Creative Agency, and Creative Forms as aspects
of the creative process. These three elements can be assimilated
to the idea of a transcendent, sovereign God; whether they
form some sort of analogy to the Trinity is another (and
interesting) question. In any case, their combination may
offer a useful way of understanding the function of God in
relation to the world.
Finally, the idea of "initial aim" may point to a way of
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understanding providence and/or the operation of the Holy
Spirit. It is interesting that even though Calvin was unattracted to this kind of speculation, his doctrine of particular
providence may be explicated metaphysically in such a way
that it too involves God as selecting the causal factors operative in each occasion. At the same time, aspects of Whiteheadian thought may make it possible to maintain-in
contrast to Calvin-human
freedom and moral responsiThis philosophical correlation of God's universal
bility.
efficacy and man's self-determination may well be a theologically important development.
a1 Cf. Cobb, "The Philosophical Grounds of Moral Responsibility:
A Comment on Matson and Niebuhr," The Journal of Philosophy,
LVI (1g5g),619-21.

